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Challenging times have confronted the beef industry during the past
decade. Rapid changes in the number, size and makeup of industry firms
and shifts from traditional ownership and marketing patterns have raised
questions  about its future structure.  What will the competitive posi-
tion of beef be relative to other meat sources domestically and interna-
tionally? How will individual producers adapt and fit into the evolving
structure?
I  will  discuss  those  changes  plus  some  of  the  basic underlying
economic factors. Hopefully,  developing a better understanding  among
producers, educators and policy makers about the economic forces driv-
ing industry change will lead to a rational policy  response consistent
with increased  competitiveness  for beef relative to the other meats.
Task Force Addresses  Producer Concerns
The National Cattlemen's Association (NCA) Beef Industry Concen-
tration/Integration Task Force, appointed October,  1988, addressed pro-
ducer concerns about ongoing changes in the industry. The fifteen task
force members represented all geographic areas, segments of beef cattle
production, age groups and degrees  of business experience.  The task
force worked together for thirteen months  and solicited input from a
wide range of resources.  It  was my privilege to serve as  the primary
staff person for the task force during the course of its deliberations.
The task force solicited input in a variety of ways:
1.  More than 215 written requests for input were distributed to state
and breed organizations; economists in academia, government and
industry; feeders; packers; marketing analysts/consultants; leader-
ship  of other  commodity  and  general  farm  organizations;  and
members of the agricultural press.
2.  The task force had the unique opportunity to meet and converse
openly and candidly with representatives  of the meat industry.
More than 150 hours of direct personal interviews were conducted
between  October,  1988,  and  October,  1989,  with:  (a) represen-
tatives  of  all  segments  of  the beef  industry  - from cow-calf
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agencies;  (c) representatives  of the pork,  poultry  and sheep  in-
dustries; and (d) extension and research economists and legal ad-
visors. These hearings were conducted with the full task force and
staff  present  and,  in  aggregate,  accounted  for  nearly  3,000
manhours.
3.  An ongoing  literature  review  of research  and agricultural  and
related publications was conducted by NCA staff. Copies of rele-
vant articles and editorials were distributed to the task force on
a regular basis.
In addition to meeting with major players from all sectors of the meat
industry, the task force identified the need for an independent,  objec-
tive analysis by individuals  not involved with the industry  on a day-
to-day basis. Dr. Ed Schuh, Dean,  Hubert H. Humphrey  Institute of
Public Affairs, University of Minnesota,  headed the research team that
conducted the independent  analysis (Johnson,  et al.).
Task Force Report
The task force final  report (National Cattlemen's  Association)  has
been circulated widely across  the industry and the process of discus-
sion and consensus  building is currently under  way.
Problem Definition
The task force identified eight issue areas for evaluation and analysis:
(1) concentration; (2) integration (by contract or ownership); (3) packer
control of inventory; (4) price discovery/reporting;  (5)  competitiveness;
(6) availability of credit (including foreign investment);  (7)  government
regulations,  and  (8)  international  developments.
Industry Structure
The following snapshot of the industry as of 1989-90 summarizes pro-
ducer concerns about  the cattle industry's  changing structure:
The January 1, 1990, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) inven-
tory report estimated approximately 950,000 operations with beef cows.
Of those, 92.6 percent have fewer than 100 beef cows (83 percent will
have fewer than 50 head and 10 percent have 50-100); 4.7 percent have
100-199 cows; 2.2 percent with 200-499 beef cows and .5 percent of the
operations with beef cows (about 4,750 operations)  have more than 500
cows. At the large end of the spectrum, the top 20 cow-calf operations
listed in the 1990 issue of Directions  averaged 14,670 cows. That means
a national beef herd  of 34 million could  be managed  by 2,300  opera-
tions of that size.
On January 1, 1990, the United States had approximately 34 million
beef cows.  Of those, 52.5 percent were  on farms with fewer than  100
cows.  (About 35  percent were on farms with fewer than 50 cows and
16.4 percent were on farms with 100  to 199 cows),  16.6 percent were
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on operations with more than 500 beef cows.  Thus, .5 percent of the
beef cow  operations  (4,750) manage  14.5 percent  of the beef cows.
Eleven states reported more than 1 million beef cows on January 1,
1990. That's 58 percent of the total beef cows. At the same time, another
five states reported between 750,000 and 1 million beef cows. Together
these 16 states accounted for over 70 percent of the U.S. beef cow herd.
In fed cattle, thirteen states accounted for about 87.5 percent (or 23
million) of the total 26.2 million  fed cattle marketed in  1989.  A total
of 46,883  feedlots was reported in those thirteen states as of 1989.  Of
those,  96.5 percent had less than 1,000  head capacity,  3 percent had
capacities of 1,000 to 15,999 and .4 percent had more than 16,000 capacity.
(79 feedlots, or less than .2 percent of the total, had more than 32,000
capacity).
Of the 23 million fed cattle marketed in the thirteen largest feeding
states,  16.4  percent  was  marketed  by feedlots  with less than  1,000
capacity,  32.5 percent was marketed by feedlots with  1,000 to 15,999
capacity and 51 percent was marketed by 198 feedlots with over 16,000
capacity.  (30.3  percent  of  the  total fed  cattle  was  marketed  by  79
feedlots with more than 32,000  capacity).
During the past ten years cattle feeding continued to shift from tradi-
tional Corn Belt and Sun Belt states to the Central  Plains.  The task
force predicted that, in the future, cattle feeding will be determined by
the availability  and cost of water.  State regulations  (environmental,
antitrust, antitechnology, protectionist, etc.) often override the natural
competitve position of states as determined  by the resource  base.
Packer  concentration  increased  dramatically during  the 1980s.  As
recently as 1980 the four largest packers slaughtered 36 percent of the
fed cattle and marketed  53 percent  of the boxed  beef.  By  1989 four
packers slaughtered and processed approximately  69 percent of the fed
cattle and marketed more than 80 percent of the boxed beef. Of those,
IBP accounted for about 28.5 percent of the total, ConAgra 21 percent,
Excel 14.5 percent  and  Beef America  5  percent.
These four packers contracted,  fed, or formula priced approximately
25 percent of their fed cattle needs  on average.  However,  the percen-
tage ranges to over 50 percent at some times of the year in some regions.
(The industry has coined the term "captive supplies" to represent the
aggregate of these methods of acquiring supplies by means other than
direct cash negotiations).
By comparison the pork industry is less concentrated  and less con-
tractually integrated (a four-firm concentration ratio in pork packing
of 37 percent  and  about 11  to  13 percent  of the market hogs  fed on
contract).  Recent trends in the pork industry  have been to more con-
tract production with Purcell predicting that pork packing will be as
concentrated as beef by the end of the decade  (Purcell). The broiler in-
dustry four-firm concentration ratio stands between the ratios for beef
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in integrator owned facilities. The four-firm concentration ratio for lamb
packers is nearly 80 percent and the largest lamb packer is the largest
lamb  feeder.  Beef  producers  are,  therefore,  competing  in an overall
animal protein  market constituted  of relatively  large,  sophisticated,
multispecies  firms.
ConAgra's recent acquisition of Beatrice and activities by Tyson and
Cargill (Excel) indicate that the traditional meat packers may evolve
as full line food companies.  If this is the case, then beef will be increas-
ingly  forced  to  compete  for  resources  (research  and  development,
marketing, promotion,  etc.) within multi-species companies  as well as
at the retail meat case  and  food service  counter.
Factors Driving  Change
The trend toward  fewer and larger firms has prevailed  throughout
agriculture. In the beef industry it has been more obvious at the packer
level, but has occurred at all levels.  These changes in the industry were
largely  driven  by  economic  factors  and  are  generally  expected  to
continue.
Overcapacity. Beef cow numbers increased  35 million from  1930 to
1975. Ten year cycles of expansion and liquidation occurred during that
time frame, but the general overall trend in cow numbers was increas-
ing. Since  1975 the ten-year  cyclical expansion and liquidation  of the
beef herd has continued. However, the overall trend in beef cow numbers
has declined. On January 1, 1990, the beef cow herd was less than 34
million head - about one million more than it was two years ago, but
still at  approximately  1965  levels.
The decline in numbers at all levels of the industry left excess capacity
in the feedlot and packing sectors - a factor closely related to contrac-
tual alignment as those sectors attempted to assure supplies and com-
pete  for  dwindling  numbers.  Productivity  increased  while  numbers
declined largely due to improved management and increased use of new
technology (larger breeds with higher yields of lean meat and reduced
slaughter of nonfed cattle). Today, approximately  2 percent less beef
is  produced with  27  percent  fewer cattle.
Declining Demand. During the  1970s, beef demand remained  rela-
tively stable.  As supplies increased,  as in 1976-77,  price declined.  As
supplies were reduced, as in 1973 or 1979, price increased. Most price
changes during the 1970s were due to shifts in supply rather than shifts
in demand.  Starting in 1980,  however, demand began declining.  Con-
sumers  would purchase  the same quantity only at a lower  inflation-
adjusted price.  This loss of demand continued until 1986. During the
1980 to 1986 period nearly the same quantities were produced and con-
sumed  - approximately  75  to 78  pounds per capita.  However,  con-
sumers would purchase that quantity only at a lower inflation adjusted
price.
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sumption declined, prices increased. Price changes were again a reflec-
tion of shifts in supply similar  to the 1970s.
Relative price increases for beef have contributed to declining demand
and lost market shares. In 1970, the price relationship of beef to broilers
was  2 to 1. Beef was twice the price of broilers. During the late 1970s
the price  difference widened to more than 4 to 1 and the relationship
between  beef and broiler prices has remained at approximately  3 to 1
during most of the 1980s. With the exception of a brief period in  1975
to 1976,  pork has generally been priced somewhere  midway between
beef  and broilers,  with minor cycling up and down.
In 1970 beef enjoyed  a 42 percent market share  of 201 pounds  per
capita total meat consumption.  By 1989 consumers purchased a record
220.5 pounds of total meat but the market share for beef declined to
31.2 percent. Projected figures for 1990 indicate a 30.5 percent market
share for beef.
Cost  Reduction. Much of the changing price relationship between beef
and the other meats  can be explained  by changing costs  throughout
the production/processing/marketing  chain. The competing meats have
been more aggressive  than beef in reducing production costs and pro-
cessing/marketing margins. Cost reductions are, in part, related to the
natural  biological  advantages  of  other  species.  Shorter  generation
length and multiple births result in faster genetic change and adapta-
tion to consumer preferences.  Concentration  at the beef packer/pro-
cessor level  has provided economies  of scale and multiplant  efficien-
cies leading to reduced real margins and improved competitiveness  in
developing  international  markets.
In  a  competitive  commodity  business,  low-cost  producers  have
positive cash flows  for a longer period of time  than higher-cost  pro-
ducers. Consequently low-cost producers are in a healthier financial posi-
tion to expand  during the good times and suffer for a shorter period
- or even have  financial reserves to expand - during the bad times.
Much of the 1980s consolidation came as a result of inefficient, poorly
capitalized or negative cash flow operators going out of business or be-
ing acquired by financially  stronger players.  Regardless of size, low-
cost producers  survive in a competitive  open  market system.
Reducing production costs was not a popular theme in the industry.
However,  costs at the cow-calf level vary by as much as 100 percent
compared to 45 to 50 percent for all feedlots. Commercial feedlot costs
vary approximately 20 to 25 percent from low- to high-cost producers,
while pork costs vary by about 30 percent and broiler costs by less than
20 percent.
What most industry media and producers missed was that the task
force did not focus only on costs at the producer level.  Rather, costs
of marketing,  transportation, processing,  packaging, spoilage,  multiple
vaccinations  - and the list goes on and on - were included.
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dustries. Beef is produced and consumed in a dispersed and segmented
industry  consisting  of  seedstock,  cow-calf,  stocker/grower,  feedlot,
packer/fabricator,  breaker/distributer,  retailer and consumer segments.
On the other hand, poultry (and increasingly pork) is produced and con-
sumed in a system with relatively  fewer  steps - integrator/grower,
retailer  and consumer  segments.  An integrated  system means lower
cost because fewer  middlemen make  a margin off the product.
Imagine  a beef system without stocker/grower  operations,  no  auc-
tions or order buyers, no purveyors/meat brokers, very few feed dealers,
only a handful of genetic companies  and possibly no futures market.
Now the picture is clearer and you can see that a lot of overhead  cur-
rently paid  by  someone  in  the beef  industry  is  eliminated.  That  is
basically the system employed by the integrated poultry industry to-
day and it's increasingly being adopted by the pork industry. It's effi-
cient and low-cost but not real popular with segments or producers that
may not  have a role (or whose  role might be significantly  altered)  in
a functionally  integrated  beef production  system.
Capital  Availability. Coordinated production or contractual integra-
tion also may be driven by individual producer  business decisions  to
reduce costs or to assure access to capital.  While the beef business is
still largely a segmented industry, the more integrated competing meats
are not so concerned  with profitability  at each production  stage. As
long as the bottom line for the entire production/marketing process is
in the black, the industry or individual firm will survive. The task force
did not advocate integration. Firms that integrate, reduce risk, become
low-cost producers and have access to capital,  however, will be survivors
at the end of the evolution.
Predictable  Products. The need for predictable, uniform quality pro-
ducts  could  continue  the contractual  alignment  trend even  if cattle
numbers expand. One major packer is testing for residues in feed supplies
as well as fed cattle delivered to the plant. Feedlot operators with a his-
tory of problems will be crossed off the acceptable  supplier list in the
future.
The task force determined  that cattlemen make individual business
decisions  to  enter into  marketing  agreements,  to contract  cattle for
future  delivery and to feed packer-owned  cattle on  a contract  basis.
These  decisions  reduce risk  for both parties  by reducing capital  re-
quirements  for  cattlemen,  and they  increase  efficiency  by reducing
marketing and transportation  costs and increasing assurance of predict-
able, uniform quality supplies. The beef industry in total is competing
in a mature market  for meat animal protein against poultry and pork
producers who have achieved or are achieving greater efficiencies  and
reduced margins.
Export Demand. Export demand will continue to play an increasing
role in the beef industry's overall financial position. Some economists
have pointed to the possibility of an  80 yen dollar to achieve the net
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creditors.  An 80 yen dollar could substantially increase export demand
for  U.S.  beef.
The flip side of the exchange  rate issue is that U.S. production  and
processing assets also become relatively less costly in terms of foreign
currency  as the dollar  declines  in value.  Recent  media articles  have
discussed Japanese purchases of some Western ranches  and packing
facilities. This trend will accelerate if devaluation of the dollar occurs.
The task force report reflected the belief that, if packers or cattlemen
become noncompetitive,  open capital markets and avoidance of protec-
tionist legislation would provide new players and restore competition.
Policy Alternatives
Alternatives  evaluated  by  the  task  force  fall  into  five  general
categories: (1)  Do nothing. Let economic forces and individual business
decisions continue to shape the structure of the industry. (2) Fine tune
the present system, primarily by increasing information availability and
flow through the industry.  (3) Coordinate producer actions,  primarily
in marketing.  Group marketing efforts  and pooled  auctions  are  ex-
amples of group action that could be pursued.  (4)  Delegate marketing
responsibilities to some type of exclusive exchange - central electronic
markets, exclusive bargaining  agencies or a marketing board. Or,  (5)
Request government or legal intervention including increased antitrust
enforcement,  stronger regulation of livestock procurement  practices,
or private lawsuits.
Recommendations
The task force made its strongest recommendation  after a thorough
evaluation of factors  driving change in the industry, the competitive
position of beef in the overall meat market, and analysis of the policy
alternatives - "That the nation and the beef industry are best served
by the capitalistic,  competitive  free market system."
Recommendations  specific to the eight issue areas  include:
1. Concentration. The task force recommends no more mergers or ac-
quisitions  of  beef  slaughter  facilities  be  allowed  by the  Big  Three
packers.
2. Integration.  The task force recommends that no action be taken to
alter  or  halt  current  trends  toward contractual  integration  among
operators  in the beef industry's various  sectors.
3. Pack and Feeder  Control  of Inventory. The task force strongly recom-
mends voluntary reporting of controlled or "captive" fed cattle inven-
tories (including numbers and days to delivery) by all packers, for each
plant, and by all feedlots to the Market News Service of the Agricultural
Marketing Service/USDA and/or cooperating private market reporting
services.
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a.  The task force recommends development of boxed beef and retail
price indexes and their use, along with live cattle prices, in develop-
ing price indexes  for fed cattle and feeder  cattle.
b.  The task force strongly encourages voluntary price reporting by
all cattle buyers and sellers to the Market  News Service  of the
Agricultural Marketing Service/USDA and/or cooperating private
market reporting  services.
5.  Competitiveness.
a.  The task force encourages research to develop  new technologies
that will lower costs of production, processing and marketing, thus
improving overall industry  efficiency.
b.  The task force recognizes the need to improve technology transfer
systems, and it endorses  the Integrated  Resource Management
concept.
c.  The task force encourages producers - individually and through
cooperative  efforts - to take advantage  of opportunities  to in-
crease profits through new marketing strategies, coordination, in-
tegration,  risk management and retained  ownership.
d.  The task force  supports check-off  and other industry  efforts in
advertising, research, industry information, new product develop-
ment, education  and  information  programs.
6. Credit and Finance.
The task  force  encourages  development  of new  credit sources  for
agriculture.
7. Government Regulation.
a.  Because of increased potential for antitrust violations, the task
force requests that the federal government  more closely monitor
mergers and acquisitions in the packing and processing industries.
b.  The task  force  encourages  the  government  to  move  toward  a
market-oriented  agriculture  rather  than  programs  involving
government controls  and subsidies.
8. International  Developments.
a.  The task force recommends that the government continue to pur-
sue a policy of reduced  trade barriers and encouragement  of fair
and open international  markets.
b.  The task force supports programs to expand international markets
for American  beef and beef products.
c.  The task force  supports  open international  capital markets.
The  future of the beef industry remains optimistic.  Many efficien-
cies achieved by competing meats lie ahead for the beef industry. Gains
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prove our competitiveness.  Innovations in packaging, processing and
product development  will further beef's gains relative to the competi-
tion. And the real plus is that the primary advantage of cattle and other
ruminants cannot be duplicated by our main competitors - converting
otherwise wasted roughage  and forages  to high quality protein.
Implications  of  Beef  Industry Structural Change
Agriculture in general is becoming more concentrated.  A challenge
for extension will be to overcome the mindset that the current institu-
tional structure is sacred. For extension to be an effective information
conduit it will have to differentiate the market and provide cutting edge
material to sophisticated commercial producers or be faced with serv-
icing  part-time  producers  more  reliant  on  off-farm  income  than
agricultural production.
At the institution and organization level, we'll see increased specializa-
tion and consolidation.  The industry probably doesn't need an animal
science department or livestock marketing specialist at every land grant
institution. Witness  poultry science departments  at institutions in a
few key poultry states. At least five national organizations represent
different  sectors of the beef industry.  The role and membership  par-
ticipation of these organizations will change as industry structure con-
tinues to evolve.
The Integrated Resource Management (IRM) concept will see increased
practical application. An advisory team including a banker, marketing
specialist, nutritionist, veterinarian,  soil or range scientist and maybe
an environmental ecologist will coordinate with the producer  to max-
imize returns. With producers tailoring a team of specialists to fit their
individual management situations the role of extension will be redefined.
Industry concentration will result in most producers and managers be-
ing comparably or better educated than many of those serving them.
Institutions must identify their role in the evolving system and pro-
vide top notch people for the team. Competition will increase for a declin-
ing number  of increasingly  sophisticated clientele  (producers).
A declining population will result in a changing political support base.
Instead of serving 950,000 individual producers,  can institutions and
organizations justify serving or representing 2,300 or 4,750 beef cow
companies?  How  about  serving  500  commercial  feedlots  instead  of
46,000?
Statistics show U.S. beef cow numbers at 34 million producing only
2 percent less beef than in 1975 when we had 45.7 million. In the future
approximately the same amount of beef will be produced with a national
beef cow herd of 20 million. The beef industry will become bimodal (small
part-time or large commercial operations) at the cow-calf level. We will
see more contractual integration,  more retained ownership and cattle
sold fewer times during the production  cycle. Cow-calf producers will
produce specification cattle using genetics with consistent, predictable
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embryos)  will sell at a deep discount.  If producers can retain positive
cash flows without specification production (because  of off-farm income,
inherited  land base,  etc.)  they will remain in business;  otherwise  the
outlook  is dim.
Overcapacity  will  continue  at the feedlot  and packing  sectors  and
become more prominent at the cow-calf level. More than one-half of all
fed cattle were marketed  by 200 feedlots  with one-time  capacities  of
16,000  or  more  in  1989.  The  trend  toward  fewer  and  larger  well-
capitalized  feedlots  that can  assume  and manage  risk will continue.
Feedlots  will feed to designated  endpoints  consistent with packer or
retailer branded  beef specifications.
Direct marketing by specification, increased coordination of produc-
tion and blurring of lines between traditional beef industry sectors will
continue.  Producers  will tend to become contractual input  suppliers,
with "marketing"  in the traditional sense taking place between  pro-
cessors  and the end  consumers  (either at the retail grocery  or  away-
from-home  food service store in the domestic market) or between pro-
cessors and exporters (in the international market). Current extension
personnel focusing on traditional "marketing" issues (selling feeder or
fed cattle, for example) will need to adapt so they can  address issues
of importance  in the evolving  system.
Changing the number and size of producers  has implications for rural
communities.  The rural infrastructure - primarily built in the mid to
late 1800s when the Homestead Act and railroads were populating the
Great Plains - may have outlived its economic justification.  Modern
production  technologies,  communications  and  transportation  have
made the existing infrastructure obsolete in some regions.  Some com-
munities  have lost the critical population mass necessary  to sustain
services  and quality  life.
Environmental  and water quality issues  will remain on the policy
agenda and will contribute to regional production shifts. These are emo-
tional,  social and political issues with economic implications. Urbanites
are willing  and  able  to  pay more for water  for every  day uses than
agriculture can pay for irrigation. Erosion of public support and increas-
ing demand for water by the growing urban population make this a dif-
ficult  issue  for  agriculture.  The  task  force  predicted  that  water
availability and cost will determine the location of cattle feeding in the
future.  The same will be true for cow-calf production. Marginally pro-
ductive grazing regions will decline in value or revert to other uses. In-
stitutions depending on defense of water intensive production practices
in water deficit regions  had better prepare to adjust.
Productivity is geared to technology application. The Catch-22 is that
technology application often hastens the trend to fewer and larger firms.
Early adopters  of technology gain and producers who can't or won't
adapt eventually go out of business. Their assets are absorbed by their
more efficient neighbors  and the "size"  of the average operation  ex-
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(research) and application  (extension)  they hasten the trend to fewer
and larger  firms.  Cochrane's  technological  treadmill  continues,  and
technology application forces producers to run faster just to keep up
(Cochrane).
Some  states have attempted  to  slow evolution in the structure  of
agriculture by passing legislation to restrict technology  application.
The effect  of these efforts ultimately will drive production to regions
with more friendly regulatory climates. National technology restriction
will lead to international production  shifts.
Limited resources  are a reality with the trend increasing.  It is time
to see some concentration  of effort, integration of resources, and con-
solidation across traditional turf lines at institutions and organizations.
When these changes are happening in the industries serviced  by the
institutions  why should institutions  expect to be exempt?
The beef industry asks that as public policy educators you help in-
crease beef producers'  understanding about their competitive business.
The  competition  is  not  the  next  sector  in  the  production/process-
ing/marketing  chain.  The  competition  is  producers  in  highly
sophisticated production systems for poultry and, increasingly, pork.
The competition  is beef  producers  in other countries  with adequate
resources to produce beef for the expanding, globalized export market.
The beef industry cannot afford to unilaterally regulate its evolving
structure while the competition continues to adapt structures and adopt
technology to become increasingly  lower cost producers.  By increas-
ing producer understanding, you, as public policy educators, can help
prevent the beef industry from pursuing policy alternatives  that will
ultimately  place  it  at  a  further  competitive  disadvantage.  At  a
minimum, better understanding of potential consequences will lead to
policy decisions based on improved knowledge of the alternatives rather
than knee-jerk emotionalism.
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